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Abstract(s)
Consideramos um mercado no qual competem uma empresa pública e uma empresa
privada, decidindo, de forma sequencial, as quantidades a produzir. O governo impõe um
imposto sobre as quantidades comercializadas, de acordo com uma função que consiste numa
soma ponderada entre o bem-estar público e a receita total obtida pela aplicação desse
imposto. O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar o efeito da privatização da empresa pública, (i)
quando a empresa líder é a empresa pública; e (ii) quando a empresa líder é a empresa
privada. Além disso, fazemos uma comparação entre os resultados obtidos nos dois modelos
estudados.
We consider a market in which a public firm and a private firm compete by deciding, sequentially, the quantities to be produced. The government imposes a tax on the quantities, according to a function that is a weighted sum of the welfare and the total revenue obtained by applying this tax. The aim of this paper is to study the effect of privatization, (i) when the leader is the public firm; and (ii) when the leader is a private firm. Furthermore, we do a comparison between the results from the two models.
We consider a market in which a public firm and a private firm compete by deciding, sequentially, the quantities to be produced. The government imposes a tax on the quantities, according to a function that is a weighted sum of the welfare and the total revenue obtained by applying this tax. The aim of this paper is to study the effect of privatization, (i) when the leader is the public firm; and (ii) when the leader is a private firm. Furthermore, we do a comparison between the results from the two models.
Description
Keywords
Duopólio misto Modelo de Stackelberg Organização industrial Teoria dos Jogos Mixed duopoly Stackelberg model Industrial organization Game theory
Citation
Publisher
Blucher