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Environmental policies and CSR in a price-setting hotel competition
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Resumo(s)
This paper investigates the strategic interaction between two competing hotels–one a consumer-friendly hotel that values both profit and consumer surplus, the other a traditional for-profit hotel–under alternative environmental policy regimes. The framework is modelled as a three-stage game. In the first stage, the government determines the environmental policy, selecting either an environmental tax, a pollution abatement subsidy, or a combination of the two. In the second stage, the hotels simultaneously choose their levels of pollution abatement investment. In the third stage, they compete in prices. The analysis characterises equilibrium outcomes under each policy regime, comparing their effects on prices, abatement efforts, profits, environmental damage, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We find that environmental damage is greater when the government adopts an abatement subsidy, while the impact on social welfare may be either positive or negative, depending on the extent of the consumer-friendly hotel’s commitment to CSR. Moreover, we prove that combining an environmental tax with an abatement subsidy is never an optimal policy choice. These findings offer clear guidance for regulators seeking efficient and effective environmental interventions in the hospitality sector.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Sustainable tourism Green hospitality Corporate social responsibility Social welfare
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Editora
Springer
Licença CC
Sem licença CC