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Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown
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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about
rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Industrial organization Game theory Oligopoly models Uncertainty
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Editora
AIP Publishing