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Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-28T01:10:20Z
dc.date.available2014-05-28T01:10:20Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractWe study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.por
dc.description.sponsorshipESEIG - Instituto Politécnico do Porto, Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto and the Programs POCTI and POCI by FCT and MCTES.por
dc.description.sponsorshipWe thank ESEIG - Instituto Politécnico do Porto, Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto and the Programs POCTI and POCI by FCT and MCTES for their financial support.
dc.identifier.doi10.1063/1.3515587
dc.identifier.isbn978-0-7354-0850-0
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4396
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.peerreviewedyespor
dc.publisherAIP Publishingpor
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/proceeding/aipcp/10.1063/1.3515587por
dc.subjectIndustrial organizationpor
dc.subjectGame theorypor
dc.subjectOligopoly modelspor
dc.subjectUncertaintypor
dc.titleBertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknownpor
dc.typeconference object
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlaceSozopol, Bulgariapor
oaire.citation.startPage203por
oaire.citation.title36th International Conference Applications of Mathematics in Engineering and Economicspor
oaire.citation.volumeAIP Conference Proceedings, vol. 1293por
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.givenNameFlávio
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspor
rcaap.typeconferenceObjectpor
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryaaa18584-508e-46b1-9b50-4e174c0e142c

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