Domestic and international price-setting mixed triopolies

Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/12080

Use this identifier to reference this record.

Name:	Description:	Size:	Format:
ART_FernandaFerreira_2018_2.pdf		128.47 KB	Adobe PDF	Download

Send Feedback

Authors

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Ferreira, Flávio

Abstract(s)

We will consider two models describing certain market structures: (i) a domestic market in which a public ﬁrm (whose objective is to maximize social welfare) competes with two private ﬁrms (whose objective is to maximize their own proﬁts); and (ii) an international market in which a domestic public ﬁrm competes with one domestic private ﬁrm and one foreign private ﬁrm. In both situations, ﬁrms decide simultaneously the price for their substitutable goods. We compare the maximum-revenue tariff with the optimum-welfare tariff, and also the other output equilibria obtained in each case. Furthermore, we also compare the results in the domestic competition with the ones in the international competition.