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Abstract(s)
A relação entre a estrutura de propriedade e a performance financeira da empresa tem
sido estudada desde Berle e Means (1932) com base em argumentos da teoria da agência que
explora os conflitos que emergem de relações desalinhadas entre principal e agente e entre
múltiplos principais e o seu impacto nas empresas. A evidência empírica é, no entanto, pouco
consensual. No âmbito desta problemática, a literatura tem vindo a atribuir alguma
relevância à dívida enquanto instrumento de mitigação de conflitos de agência internos,
ainda que se reconheça o seu feito adverso sobre a gestão de conflitos de agência externos
bem como sobre os custos de falência.
Neste trabalho, procuramos explorar argumentos da teoria da agência (algumas vezes
dicotómicos) testando explicitamente a relevância da alavancagem sobre a performance
financeira das empresas, considerando múltiplas estruturas de propriedade e de gestão,
usando uma amostra de dados em painel, com cerca de 13706 Pequenas e Médias Empresas
(PME) portuguesas e espanholas do setor da manufatura a operar entre 2008-2017.
Os resultados mostram que empresas detidas apenas por um único acionista/sócio
apresentam melhor desempenho financeiro face às demais. Os resultados sugerem, ainda,
que o exercício de funções duais por parte do proprietário está positivamente relacionado
com o desempenho da empresa. Por fim, oferecemos evidências acerca de uma relação
côncava entre a alavancagem e a performance financeira com magnitudes distintas para
diferentes combinações entre características de propriedade e de gestão. Globalmente, estes
resultados mostram-se robustos quando estudamos duas medidas de performance financeira,
estimando os modelos através de dois métodos alternativos, e controlando o efeito da
dimensão da empresa, tangibilidade, turbulência macroeconómica e a região.
The relation between ownership structure and firm's financial performance has been studied since Berle and Means (1932) based on agency theory’s arguments that exploit the conflicts that emerge from misaligned principal-agent relationships and between multiple principals’ relationships and its impact on companies. The empirical evidence is, however, not consensual. In the context of this problem, the literature that is giving some relevance to debt as a tool to mitigate internal agency conflicts, although recognizing its adverse effect on external agency conflict management and bankruptcy costs. In this work, we explore agency theory’s arguments (sometimes dichotomous), explicitly testing the relevance of leverage on companies' financial performance, considering various ownership and management structures, using a panel data sample of approximately 13706 Portuguese and Spanish Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) operating in the manufacturing sector between 2008-2017. The results show that companies owned only by a single shareholder have better financial performance than others. The results also suggest that the exercise of dual functions by the owner is positively related to the company performance. Finally, we offer evidence of a concave relationship between leverage and financial performance with different magnitudes for different combinations between ownership and management characteristics. Overall, these results are robust when we study two measures of financial performance, estimate models using two alternative methods, and control the effect of firm size, tangibility, macroeconomic turbulence, and a region.
The relation between ownership structure and firm's financial performance has been studied since Berle and Means (1932) based on agency theory’s arguments that exploit the conflicts that emerge from misaligned principal-agent relationships and between multiple principals’ relationships and its impact on companies. The empirical evidence is, however, not consensual. In the context of this problem, the literature that is giving some relevance to debt as a tool to mitigate internal agency conflicts, although recognizing its adverse effect on external agency conflict management and bankruptcy costs. In this work, we explore agency theory’s arguments (sometimes dichotomous), explicitly testing the relevance of leverage on companies' financial performance, considering various ownership and management structures, using a panel data sample of approximately 13706 Portuguese and Spanish Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) operating in the manufacturing sector between 2008-2017. The results show that companies owned only by a single shareholder have better financial performance than others. The results also suggest that the exercise of dual functions by the owner is positively related to the company performance. Finally, we offer evidence of a concave relationship between leverage and financial performance with different magnitudes for different combinations between ownership and management characteristics. Overall, these results are robust when we study two measures of financial performance, estimate models using two alternative methods, and control the effect of firm size, tangibility, macroeconomic turbulence, and a region.
Description
Keywords
Custos de agência Estrutura de propriedade Gestão Performance financeira Dívida PME Management Financial performance Agency costs Ownership structure Debt SME