Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4489

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Authors

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Ferreira, Flávio

Abstract(s)

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where ﬁrms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public ﬁrm by comparing welfare among three games. We ﬁnd that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public ﬁrm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private ﬁrm.