A carregar...
Publicação
Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms
| Nome: | Descrição: | Tamanho: | Formato: | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 386.84 KB | Adobe PDF |
Autores
Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand.
Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Industrial organization Nonprofit Asymmetric taxation Stochastic demand Bayesian-Nash equilibrium