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Abstract(s)
Este estudo, centrado no investimento de capital de risco em Portugal, pretendeu evidenciar a importância do acompanhamento e monitorização dos projetos na fase pós-investimento. Centrou-se na seguinte questão de investigação: “Como se processa o acompanhamento das empresas participadas pelas entidades de capital de risco no período pós-investimento e como as controlam?”
A teoria argumenta que para mitigar o risco de agência na fase pós-investimento é necessário efetuar um acompanhamento eficaz, desenvolvendo relacionamentos adequados com as participadas através de uma comunicação frequente, detalhada e atempada durante a evolução do projeto.
Para o objetivo central do estudo – avaliar o processo de acompanhamento e monitorização realizado pelos investidores de capital de risco em Portugal - foi realizado um estudo empírico, consubstanciado num questionário promovido junto das entidades participadas pelos investidores de risco, que recolheu dados sobre as práticas de monitorização observadas.
Os resultados do questionário realizado no âmbito do presente trabalho fornecem evidências que apontam para um acompanhamento relativamente intenso das empresas participadas. Os investidores adotam práticas ativas de acompanhamento das suas participadas, principalmente em áreas relacionadas com a gestão ou em áreas mais sensíveis. Para minimizar a assimetria de informação e o problema do agente-principal, os investidores de risco optam por solicitar um grande número de relatórios e informações financeiras sobre o desempenho das participadas e com periodicidade elevada. Além disso, acompanham as empresas participadas através de visitas e reuniões frequentes para discussão dos assuntos mais importantes. Finalmente, o estudo fornece suporte à perspetiva de que as restrições incluídas nos contratos de investimento por si só não poderiam reduzir significativamente a assimetria da informação, sendo necessário o recurso a um conjunto mais alargado de instrumentos de monitorização.
This study, focused on the investment of venture capital in Portugal, aimed to highlight the importance of follow-up and monitoring projects in the post investment phase. It focused on the following research question: "How are the follow-up of the companies owned by venture capital entities in the post-investment period and how do they control them?" The theory argues that to mitigate the risk of agency in the post-investment phase is necessary to carry out effective follow-up, developing appropriate relationships with stakeholders through frequent, detailed and timely communication during the project development. For the central objective of the study - to evaluate the follow-up and monitoring process carried out by the venture capital investors in Portugal - an empirical study was made, based on a survey carried out with the entities involved by risk investors, which collected data on monitored. The results of the survey implemented within the scope of the present study provide evidence indicating relatively intense follow-up of the investee companies. Investors adopt active practices to monitor their investees, mainly in areas related to management or in more sensitive areas. To minimize information asymmetry and the principal agent problem, risk investors choose to request a large number of reports and financial information on the performance of the investees at high frequency. Also, they accompany the investees through frequent visits and meetings to discuss the most important issues. Finally, the study supports the view that the restrictions included in investment contracts alone could not significantly reduce information asymmetry, requiring a wider set of monitoring tools.
This study, focused on the investment of venture capital in Portugal, aimed to highlight the importance of follow-up and monitoring projects in the post investment phase. It focused on the following research question: "How are the follow-up of the companies owned by venture capital entities in the post-investment period and how do they control them?" The theory argues that to mitigate the risk of agency in the post-investment phase is necessary to carry out effective follow-up, developing appropriate relationships with stakeholders through frequent, detailed and timely communication during the project development. For the central objective of the study - to evaluate the follow-up and monitoring process carried out by the venture capital investors in Portugal - an empirical study was made, based on a survey carried out with the entities involved by risk investors, which collected data on monitored. The results of the survey implemented within the scope of the present study provide evidence indicating relatively intense follow-up of the investee companies. Investors adopt active practices to monitor their investees, mainly in areas related to management or in more sensitive areas. To minimize information asymmetry and the principal agent problem, risk investors choose to request a large number of reports and financial information on the performance of the investees at high frequency. Also, they accompany the investees through frequent visits and meetings to discuss the most important issues. Finally, the study supports the view that the restrictions included in investment contracts alone could not significantly reduce information asymmetry, requiring a wider set of monitoring tools.
Description
Versão final (Esta versão contém as críticas e sugestões dos elementos do júri)
Keywords
Capital de risco Acompanhamento Assimetria de informação Portugal Venture capital Monitoring Information asymmetries