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Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty in a differentiated duopoly

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On a symmetric differentiated Stackelberg duopoly model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by leading and follower firms, we show that the leading firm does not necessarily have advantage over the following one. The reason for this is that the second mover can adjust its output level after observing the realized demand, while the first mover chooses its output level only with the knowledge of demand distribution.

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Differentiation Duopoly Nash equilibrium Optimization Stackelberg Stochastic control

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Acta Press

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