Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4599

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Authors

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Ferreira, Flávio

Abstract(s)

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public ﬁrm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the ﬁrms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.