Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4386

Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo.

Nome:	Descrição:	Tamanho:	Formato:
COM_FernandaAFerreira_2011_1.pdf		1.21 MB	Adobe PDF	Ver/Abrir

Contacte-nos

Autores

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Ferreira, Flávio

Resumo(s)

In this paper, we study an international duopoly market where firms set prices. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import Tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a price-setting competition. We study three different roles: (i) simultaneous decisions (Bertrand model); (ii) sequential decisions with home firm as the leader; and (iii) sequential decisions with home firm as the follower. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decisions make of the firms.

Descrição

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

Palavras-chave

Industrial organization Game theory Bertrand model Leadership

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4386

Editora

International Association of Engineers

Coleções

ESEIG - MAT - Comunicações em eventos científicos

Ver registo completo