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Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

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Resumo(s)

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

Descrição

Palavras-chave

Game theory Stackelberg model Demand uncertainty Differentiation Perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Contexto Educativo

Citação

Fernanda A. Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira, Miguel Ferreira & Alberto A. Pinto (2015) Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods, Optimization, 64:4, 877-893, DOI: 10.1080/02331934.2013.836649

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Fascículo

Editora

Taylor & Francis

Licença CC

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