Repository logo
 
Publication

Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

2015Journal article Open access
Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Miguel
dc.contributor.authorPinto, Alberto A.
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-06T11:20:42Z
dc.date.available2014-01-06T11:20:42Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractWe study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.por
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is part-funded by the ERDF European Regional Development Fund through the COMPETE Programme (operational programme for competitiveness) and by National Funds through the FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology) within project FCOMP – 01-0124-FEDER-022701.This work was partly funded by National Funds through the FCT Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology) within project PTDC/MAT/121107/2010. Fernanda Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira and Miguel Ferreira thank financial support from ESEIG/IPP. Alberto Pinto also thanks financial support from FCUP/UP. Miguel Ferreira also thanks financial support given by FCT in the form of a Pos-Doc grant with the reference SFRH/BPD/73357/2010.por
dc.identifier.citationFernanda A. Ferreira, Flávio Ferreira, Miguel Ferreira & Alberto A. Pinto (2015) Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods, Optimization, 64:4, 877-893, DOI: 10.1080/02331934.2013.836649por
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/02331934.2013.836649
dc.identifier.issn1029-4945
dc.identifier.issn0233-1934por
dc.identifier.other10.1080/02331934.2013.836649
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/3212
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.peerreviewedyespor
dc.publisherTaylor & Francispor
dc.relationFCOMP – 01-0124-FEDER-022701
dc.relationPTDC/MAT/121107/2010
dc.relationSFRH/BPD/73357/2010
dc.relation.ispartofseriesOptimization: A Journal of Mathematical Programming and Operations Research
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02331934.2013.836649#.UsqPyNJdXTopor
dc.subjectGame theorypor
dc.subjectStackelberg modelpor
dc.subjectDemand uncertaintypor
dc.subjectDifferentiationpor
dc.subjectPerfect Bayesian equilibriumpor
dc.titleFlexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goodspor
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.titleOptimization: A Journal of Mathematical Programming and Operations Researchpor
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.givenNameFlávio
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspor
rcaap.typearticlepor
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationaaa18584-508e-46b1-9b50-4e174c0e142c
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryaaa18584-508e-46b1-9b50-4e174c0e142c

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
ART_FernandaFerreira_2013_3.pdf
Size:
1.36 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

ESEIG - MAT - Artigos