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Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty

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dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.contributor.authorPinto, Alberto A.
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-08T14:55:41Z
dc.date.available2015-10-08T14:55:41Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.pt_PT
dc.description.sponsorshipWe thank the programS POCTI and POCI by FCT and Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e do Ensino Superior, and Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto for their financial support. Fernanda Ferreira gratefully acknowledges financial support from ESEIG/IPP and from PRODEP III by FSE and EU. Flávio Ferreira also acknowledges financial support from ESEIG/IPP.
dc.identifier.citationFerreira, F. A., Ferreira, F., & Pinto, A. (2008). Equilibria of Quantity Setting Differentiated Duopoly with Uncertainty. In V. Boljuncic, L. Neralic, & K. Soric (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Operational Research. Zagreb: Croatian Operational Research Society.pt_PT
dc.identifier.isbn978-953-7498-11-5
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6662
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.publisherCroatian Operational Research Societypt_PT
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://oliver.efpu.hr/koi06/koi06_proceedings.pdfpt_PT
dc.subjectGame theorypt_PT
dc.subjectIndustrial organizationpt_PT
dc.subjectOptimizationpt_PT
dc.subjectStackelbergpt_PT
dc.subjectDuopolypt_PT
dc.subjectDifferentiationpt_PT
dc.subjectUncertaintypt_PT
dc.titleEquilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertaintypt_PT
dc.typeconference object
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlacePula, Croatiapt_PT
oaire.citation.endPage224pt_PT
oaire.citation.startPage217pt_PT
oaire.citation.titleProceedings of International Conference on Operational Research, 11thpt_PT
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.givenNameFlávio
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typeconferenceObjectpt_PT
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66

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