Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4513

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Authors

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Ferreira, Flávio

Abstract(s)

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home ﬁrm’s proﬁt and the total revenue. Then, the ﬁrms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the ﬁrms.