Signalling in an international Cournot model

Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Moreira, Humberto A.; Pinto, Alberto A.

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4391

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Autores

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Moreira, Humberto A.

Pinto, Alberto A.

Resumo(s)

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Palavras-chave

Game theory Industrial organization Cournot model Signalization

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4391

Editora

AIP Publishing

DOI

10.1063/1.3241653

Coleções

ESEIG - MAT - Comunicações em eventos científicos

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