Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

Ferreira, Fernanda A.; Ferreira, Flávio

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4392

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Autores

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Ferreira, Flávio

Resumo(s)

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Palavras-chave

Industrial organization Bertrand oligopoly Uncertainty Bayesian-Nash equilibrium

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4392

Editora

AIP Publishing

DOI

10.1063/1.2990892

Coleções

ESEIG - MAT - Comunicações em eventos científicos

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