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Hotel competition under uncertain demand: different objective functions

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dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-22T09:08:46Z
dc.date.available2020-04-22T09:08:46Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractThis research applies game theory to analyse price-set competition between a nonprofit hotel and a for-profit (private) hotel, in a differentiated service market, with uncertain demand. The nonprofit hotel aims to maximize social welfare. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, and we analyse the effects of the degree of the weight assigned to consumer surplus on market equilibrium outcomes. As a result, we get that as the nonprofit hotel values more the consumer surplus, both hotels set lower prices. Furthermore, the expected profit of the for-profit hotel decreases with the degree of the weight assigned to consumer surplus; and the expected profit of the nonprofit hotel decreases (resp., increases) with the degree of altruistic preference, for either low (resp., high) values of this degree. We also compare the results obtained with the ones when the nonprofit hotel aims to maximize the sum of its own profit with the consumer surplus (with some weight assigned to it).pt_PT
dc.description.sponsorshipAuthors thank to UNIAG, R&D unit funded by FCT - Portuguese Foundation for the Development of Science and Technology, Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, under the Project UID/GES/04752/2019.
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.34190/IRT.20.051
dc.identifier.eissn2516-3612
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-912764-55-6
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-912764-54-9
dc.identifier.issn2516-3604
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/15822
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.publisherAcademic Conferences and Publishing Internationalpt_PT
dc.relationUID/GES/04752/2019
dc.subjectGame theorypt_PT
dc.subjectBertrand modelpt_PT
dc.subjectHotel pricing strategiespt_PT
dc.subjectDemand uncertaintypt_PT
dc.titleHotel competition under uncertain demand: different objective functionspt_PT
dc.typeconference object
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlaceValencia, Spainpt_PT
oaire.citation.endPage67pt_PT
oaire.citation.startPage60pt_PT
oaire.citation.titleProceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Tourism Research ICTR 2020pt_PT
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFlávio
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
rcaap.rightsclosedAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typeconferenceObjectpt_PT
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationaaa18584-508e-46b1-9b50-4e174c0e142c
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66

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