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Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-05T15:48:16Z
dc.date.available2014-06-05T15:48:16Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.por
dc.description.sponsorshipESEIG/IPPpor
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors would like to thank financial support from ESEIG / IPP
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/NSC.2012.6304731
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4673-2702-2
dc.identifier.otherE-ISBN 978-1-4673-2701-5
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4506
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.peerreviewedyespor
dc.publisherIEEEpor
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6304731&queryText%3DPrivatization+and+government+preference+in+a+public+Stackelberg+leader+duopolypor
dc.titlePrivatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopolypor
dc.typeconference object
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlaceBudapestpor
oaire.citation.endPage90por
oaire.citation.startPage87por
oaire.citation.titleIEEE 4th International Conference on Nonlinear Science and Complexity (NSC), 2012por
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.givenNameFlávio
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
rcaap.rightsclosedAccesspor
rcaap.typeconferenceObjectpor
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66

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