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Environmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly

dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-30T09:22:55Z
dc.date.available2014-06-30T09:22:55Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractWe study whether privatization of a public firm improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We get that, since in the mixed market the industry output is higher than in the private market, the abatement levels are also higher in the mixed market, and, thus, environmental tax rate in the mixed duopoly is higher than that in the privatized duopoly. Furthermore, the environment is more damaged in the mixed than in the private market. The overall effect on the social welfare is that it will becomes higher in the private than in the mixed market.por
dc.description.sponsorshipESEIG/IPPpor
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors would like to thank financial support from ESEIG / IPP.
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/NSC.2012.6304732
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4673-2702-2
dc.identifier.otherE-ISBN 978-1-4673-2701-5
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4597
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.peerreviewedyespor
dc.publisherIEEEpor
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6304732por
dc.subjectFinancepor
dc.subjectGamespor
dc.subjectGovernmentpor
dc.subjectLinear programmingpor
dc.subjectOligopolypor
dc.subjectPollutionpor
dc.subjectPivatizationpor
dc.titleEnvironmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopolypor
dc.typeconference object
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlaceBudapest, Hungarypor
oaire.citation.endPage94por
oaire.citation.startPage91por
oaire.citation.titleIEEE International Conference on Nonlinear Science and Complexity, 4thpor
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.givenNameFlávio
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
rcaap.rightsclosedAccesspor
rcaap.typeconferenceObjectpor
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66

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