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Comparison between different licensing schemes in a Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
In the present paper we consider a differentiated-good Stackelberg model, when the follower firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. We assume that there can exist a technology transfer between innovator and non-innovator firm. The aim of this paper is three-fold: to do a comparison of the fixed-fee and royalty licensing cases, of the two-part tariff and royalty licensing cases, respectively of the two-part tariff and fixed-fee licensing cases, in order to state in which case is indicated for the innovator firm to license its technology. This comparison allows us to identify which licensing scheme is more profitable for the innovator (follower firm).
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Industrial organization Game theory Licensing Stackelberg competition Differentiated goods Innovation size
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Editora
https://content.iospress.com/articles/journal-of-computational-methods-in-sciences-and-engineering/jcm204386