Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4395

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Autores

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Resumo(s)

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Palavras-chave

Industrial organization Nonprofit Asymmetric taxation Stochastic demand Bayesian-Nash equilibrium

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4395

Editora

AIP Publishing

DOI

10.1063/1.3366514

Coleções

ESEIG - MAT - Comunicações em eventos científicos

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