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Privatization and optimum-welfare in an international Cournot duopoly

dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-03T15:34:10Z
dc.date.available2017-01-03T15:34:10Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we will analyse the relationship between privatization of a public firm and tax revenue for the domestic government in an international competition, with import tariffs. We consider a duopoly model where a domestic public firmand a foreign private firmcompete in the domesticmarket, asCournot players. Furthermore, the domestic government imposes a tariff to regulate an imported good, and may have a higher preference for tariff revenue than for social welfare. We compute the outputs at equilibrium and we show that privatization (i) will increase the profits of both domestic and foreign firms; (ii) will increase the tariff imposed to the imported good; and (iii) will decrease the domestic welfare. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a rise in the government’s preference for tariff revenues raises the social welfare in both mixed and private models.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.issn1854-6935
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/9086
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.publisherUniversity of Primorska. Faculty of Management Koperpt_PT
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://econpapers.repec.org/article/mgtyoumgt/v_3a14_3ay_3a2016_3ai_3a4_3ap_3a351-358.htm
dc.subjectGame theorypt_PT
dc.subjectIndustrial organizationpt_PT
dc.subjectCournot modelpt_PT
dc.subjectPrivatizationpt_PT
dc.titlePrivatization and optimum-welfare in an international Cournot duopolypt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.endPage358pt_PT
oaire.citation.startPage351pt_PT
oaire.citation.titleManaging Global Transitionspt_PT
oaire.citation.volumeVol. 14, issue 4pt_PT
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.givenNameFlávio
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationaaa18584-508e-46b1-9b50-4e174c0e142c
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66

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