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Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot

dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-05T11:41:42Z
dc.date.available2014-06-05T11:41:42Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by considering a (sequential) Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm. Furthermore, we compare our results with the ones previously published by an other author obtained in a (simultaneous) Cournot duopoly.por
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_24
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-319-01410-4
dc.identifier.otherE-ISBN 978-3-319-01411-1
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4498
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.peerreviewedyespor
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishingpor
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNonlinear Systems and Complexity;6
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_24por
dc.subjectStackelberg duopolypor
dc.subjectCournot duopolypor
dc.subjectMixed duopolypor
dc.subjectPrivatizationpor
dc.subjectTax ratepor
dc.titlePrivatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournotpor
dc.typebook part
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.endPage430por
oaire.citation.startPage421por
oaire.citation.titleDiscontinuity and Complexity in Nonlinear Physical Systemspor
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.givenNameFlávio
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
rcaap.rightsclosedAccesspor
rcaap.typebookPartpor
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66

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