Two-production-period in a duopoly with nonprofit and for-profit firms

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4387

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Authors

Ferreira, Fernanda A.

Abstract(s)

We investigate endogenous roles in a competition between a nonproﬁt ﬁrm and a for-proﬁt ﬁrm in a homogeneous goods market, by allowing two production periods. We ﬁnd that the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonproﬁt ﬁrm becomes the follower exist; however, another tackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonproﬁt ﬁrm becomes the leader does not exist.