Two new power indices based on winning coalitions

Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Ferreira, Flávio; Álvarez-Mozos, M.; Pinto, Alberto A.

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6687

Use this identifier to reference this record.

Name:	Description:	Size:	Format:
ART_FlavioFerreira_2011_1.pdf		389.28 KB	Adobe PDF	Download

Send Feedback

Authors

Alonso-Meijide, J. M.

Ferreira, Flávio

Álvarez-Mozos, M.

Pinto, Alberto A.

Abstract(s)

Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.

Keywords

Power indices Simple games Decision-making processes

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6687

Citation

J. M. Alonso-Meijide , F. Ferreira , M. Álvarez-Mozos & A. A. Pinto (2011) Two new power indices based on winning coalitions, Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, 17:7, 1095-1100, DOI: 10.1080/10236190903200677