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Licensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competition

dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Fernanda A.
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, Flávio
dc.contributor.authorBode, Oana R.
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-04T12:20:11Z
dc.date.available2020-12-04T12:20:11Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we consider, on one hand, a differentiated Cournot model, and, on the other hand, a differentiated Bertrand model, when one of the firms engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim of the present paper is two-fold. The first is to study the licensing of the costreduction by a per-unit royalty and a fixed-fee in these Cournot and Bertrand models. The second is to do a direct comparison between Cournot model and Bertrand model. We analyse the implications of these types of licensing contracts over the R&D effort, the profits of the firms, the consumer surplus and the social welfare. We show that some previous results for two-part tariff licensing are not robust, in the sense that they can be not true for just either a per-unit royalty contract or a fixed-fee contract. Furthermore, by using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods assumes a great importance in the results. We also discuss the optimal licensing, meaning that which licensing method is preferred, in each of the duopoly models considered.pt_PT
dc.description.sponsorshipAuthors F. A. Ferreira and F. Ferreira thank to UNIAG, R&D unit funded by FCT - Portuguese Foundation for the Development of Science and Technology, Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, under the Projects UID/GES/04752/2019 and UIDB/04752/2020
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/1331677X.2020.1844586pt_PT
dc.identifier.eissn1848-9664
dc.identifier.issn1331-677X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/16529
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.publisherTaylor & Francispt_PT
dc.relationUIDB/04752/2020
dc.relationUID/GES/04752/2019
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1331677X.2020.1844586pt_PT
dc.subjectLicensingpt_PT
dc.subjectCournot competitionpt_PT
dc.subjectBertrand competitionpt_PT
dc.subjectDifferentiated goodspt_PT
dc.titleLicensing under Cournot vs Bertrand competitionpt_PT
dc.typeconference object
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.titleEconomic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanjapt_PT
person.familyNameFerreira
person.familyNameFerreira
person.givenNameFernanda A.
person.givenNameFlávio
person.identifierR-000-4TV
person.identifier.ciencia-idD116-9419-5778
person.identifier.ciencia-id9F13-D3C6-244B
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-1335-7821
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-7812-0983
person.identifier.ridN-4563-2013
person.identifier.ridN-4562-2013
person.identifier.scopus-author-id24723992800
person.identifier.scopus-author-id22978799800
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typeconferenceObjectpt_PT
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationaaa18584-508e-46b1-9b50-4e174c0e142c
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6f67981a-3965-4ace-aec9-65938c4bcf66
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryaaa18584-508e-46b1-9b50-4e174c0e142c

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