Ferreira, Fernanda A.Ferreira, Flávio2018-10-232018-10-2320182164-64572164-6473http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/12080We will consider two models describing certain market structures: (i) a domestic market in which a public firm (whose objective is to maximize social welfare) competes with two private firms (whose objective is to maximize their own profits); and (ii) an international market in which a domestic public firm competes with one domestic private firm and one foreign private firm. In both situations, firms decide simultaneously the price for their substitutable goods. We compare the maximum-revenue tariff with the optimum-welfare tariff, and also the other output equilibria obtained in each case. Furthermore, we also compare the results in the domestic competition with the ones in the international competition.engModelingOptimizationIndustrial OrganizationGame theoryjournal article10.5890/JAND.2018.09.004