Ferreira, Fernanda A.Ferreira, Flávio2014-06-052014-06-052012978-1-4673-2702-2E-ISBN 978-1-4673-2701-5http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4506We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.engconference object10.1109/NSC.2012.6304731