Ferreira, FlávioFerreira, Fernanda A.2021-11-052021-11-052021978-1-912764-93-8978-1-912764-92-1http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/18817In this paper, we incorporate environment issues into a quality and quantity competition between two asymmetric restaurants We apply Game Theory (Game Theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction between rational decision-makers) to study a competition of restaurant industry, defining a three-stage model. We compute the subgame perfect equilibrium, and we analyse the effects of the effects of difference of restaurants' reputation on the equilibrium outputs. As a result, we get that the increase in the reputation difference between restaurants reduces the quality and output of the small restaurant, and increases the quality and output of the large restaurant, being the overall effect an increase in the total quality and the aggregate quantity in the market. Moreover, the increase in the reputation difference between restaurants decreases profits of the small restaurant and raises both social welfare and profits of the large restaurant. In conclusion, restaurants' reputation has an important impact on the environmental deterioration. The effects of the valuation of the environment by the government are also investigated. We show that as the government values more the environment, emission standards are reduced, as well as quality and quantity of meals produced by both small and large restaurants. Furthermore, the increase in the valuation of the environment by the government raises social welfare and decreases profits of the large restaurant, while it is ambiguous for the small restaurant's profits. So, governments have tools they can use to control environmental degradation.engGame theoryDuopoly marketSlow foodGreen environmentRestaurant sustainabilityQuality competition, environmental policies and reputation of restaurantsconference object10.34190/IRT.21.081