Ferreira, FlávioBode, Oana R.2014-01-022014-01-022013Ferreira, F., & Bode, O. R. (2013). Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model. Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 18(2), 308 – 315. DOI:10.1016/j.cnsns.2012.07.0011007-5704http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/3181In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.engGame theoryIndustrial organizationOptimizationStackelberg modelR&D investmentsLicensingjournal article10.1016/j.cnsns.2012.07.001