Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/7359
Título: Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly
Autor: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
Ferreira, Miguel
Pinto, Alberto A.
Data: 2009
Editora: Springer Netherlands
Resumo: In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/7359
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-8678-6_31
ISBN: 978-1-4020-8677-9
Versão do Editor: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4020-8678-6_31
Aparece nas colecções:ESEIG - MAT - Livros, partes de livro ou capítulos de livro

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