Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/7300
Título: Uncertainty on a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation
Autor: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Pinto, Alberto A.
Palavras-chave: Game theory
Industrial organization
Optimization
Bertrand model
Uncertainty
Data: 2011
Editora: Springer Netherlands
Resumo: The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/7300
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-9884-9_45
ISBN: 978-90-481-9883-2
978-90-481-9884-9
Versão do Editor: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-90-481-9884-9_45
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