Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6662
Título: Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty
Autor: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
Pinto, Alberto A.
Palavras-chave: Game theory
Industrial organization
Data: 2008
Editora: Croatian Operational Research Society
Citação: Ferreira, F. A., Ferreira, F., & Pinto, A. (2008). Equilibria of Quantity Setting Differentiated Duopoly with Uncertainty. In V. Boljuncic, L. Neralic, & K. Soric (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Operational Research. Zagreb: Croatian Operational Research Society.
Resumo: In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.
Peer review: yes
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6662
ISBN: 978-953-7498-11-5
Versão do Editor: http://oliver.efpu.hr/koi06/koi06_proceedings.pdf
Aparece nas colecções:ESEIG - MAT - Comunicações em eventos científicos

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