Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6637
Título: Privatization and social welfare in an international mixed Stackelberg duopoly
Autor: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
Palavras-chave: Operations research
Game theory
Stackelberg model
Data: 2015
Editora: IEEE
Resumo: Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, airlines industries, as weel as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg models (firms move sequentially). Tomaru [1] analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing in the domestic market with a foreign firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses the amount of cost-reducing R&D investment. Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. Two cases are considered: (i) The domestic firm is the leader; (ii) The foreign firm is the leader. We show that the results obtained in [1] for Cournot competition are robust in the sence that they are also true when firms move sequentially.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6637
Aparece nas colecções:ESEIG - MAT - Pósteres, resumos em eventos científicos

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