Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4597
Título: Environmental taxes in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly
Autor: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
Palavras-chave: Finance
Games
Government
Linear programming
Oligopoly
Pollution
Pivatization
Data: 2012
Editora: IEEE
Resumo: We study whether privatization of a public firm improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We get that, since in the mixed market the industry output is higher than in the private market, the abatement levels are also higher in the mixed market, and, thus, environmental tax rate in the mixed duopoly is higher than that in the privatized duopoly. Furthermore, the environment is more damaged in the mixed than in the private market. The overall effect on the social welfare is that it will becomes higher in the private than in the mixed market.
Peer review: yes
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4597
ISBN: 978-1-4673-2702-2
Versão do Editor: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6304732
Aparece nas colecções:ESEIG - MAT - Comunicações em eventos científicos

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