Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4506
Título: Privatization and government preference in a public Stackelberg leader duopoly
Autor: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
Data: 2012
Editora: IEEE
Resumo: We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm.
Peer review: yes
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4506
ISBN: 978-1-4673-2702-2
Versão do Editor: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6304731&queryText%3DPrivatization+and+government+preference+in+a+public+Stackelberg+leader+duopoly
Aparece nas colecções:ESEIG - MAT - Comunicações em eventos científicos

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