Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4498
Título: Privatization and government preferences in a mixed duopoly: Stackelberg versus Cournot
Autor: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
Palavras-chave: Stackelberg duopoly
Cournot duopoly
Mixed duopoly
Privatization
Tax rate
Data: 2014
Editora: Springer International Publishing
Relatório da Série N.º: Nonlinear Systems and Complexity;6
Resumo: We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue, by considering a (sequential) Stackelberg duopoly with the public firm as the leader. We assume that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We get that if the government puts a sufficiently larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will not privatize the public firm. In contrast, if the government puts a moderately larger weight on tax revenue than on the sum of both surpluses, it will privatize the public firm. Furthermore, we compare our results with the ones previously published by an other author obtained in a (simultaneous) Cournot duopoly.
Peer review: yes
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4498
ISBN: 978-3-319-01410-4
Versão do Editor: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-01411-1_24
Aparece nas colecções:ESEIG - MAT - Livros, partes de livro ou capítulos de livro

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