Utilize este identificador para referenciar este registo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4386
Título: Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition
Autor: Ferreira, Fernanda A.
Ferreira, Flávio
Palavras-chave: Industrial organization
Game theory
Bertrand model
Leadership
Data: 2011
Editora: International Association of Engineers
Resumo: In this paper, we study an international duopoly market where firms set prices. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import Tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a price-setting competition. We study three different roles: (i) simultaneous decisions (Bertrand model); (ii) sequential decisions with home firm as the leader; and (iii) sequential decisions with home firm as the follower. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decisions make of the firms.
Descrição: Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science
Peer review: yes
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4386
ISBN: 978-988-18210-6-5
ISSN: 2078-0958
2078-0966
Versão do Editor: http://www.iaeng.org/publication/WCE2011/
Aparece nas colecções:ESEIG - MAT - Comunicações em eventos científicos

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